Russell

In 1914 both Henry Bergson and Bertrand Russell, two of only three philosophers to ever receive a Nobel prize, were at the peak of their creativity, and it was just then that Russell chose to deliver an extensive criticism of Bergson: an article entitled “Mysticism and Logic.” Though largely addressed to Bergson, the article contains a general appraisal of mysticism, and of its relations to logic. Russell identifies four basic tenets of mysticism. One is epistemological: a belief in a special, infallible source of knowledge, variously labeled insight, intuition, illumination, or even instinct. The other three are metaphysical: an assertion of universal unity, and refusal to admit any divisions; a denial of the reality of time; and a denial of the reality of evil. Russell finds these tenets relevant to Bergson, and is critical of them as they surface in Bergson’s work; but in the end he does not seem as critical of mysticism as such. Mysticism and logic, in fact, seem to be complementary to one another for him: insight or intuition is what provides those principles of a science (including logic) that reason cannot itself provide (that is, prove); but, when principles are provided, reason must go to work to test their consistency with each other and with the data which are otherwise available. It is not reliance on insight that is to be criticized then, but exclusive reliance on it. And logic and mysticism, though they work best when they work together, are seen in this picture as being essentially apart, essentially different.