This chapter analyzes truth-conditional approaches to mental representation, focusing on both purely extensional conceptions and Davidson’s more nuanced framework. Through examination of descriptive and descriptive-directive representations, it demonstrates how truth conditions serve as paradigmatic examples of satisfaction conditions while exploring whether such conditions suffice for understanding content. The analysis proceeds in two parts: first evaluating purely extensional conceptions of meaning as truth conditions, revealing their limitations through the slingshot argument and objections from Foster and Harman. The second part examines Davidson’s modified approach linking truth conditions to action and communication. Using examples from cognitive science—including concept learning and cognitive maps—the chapter demonstrates both the utility and limitations of truth-conditional semantics for describing different types of mental representation. The discussion establishes that while truth-conditional approaches offer valuable formal tools for distinguishing representational types, they ultimately fail to naturalize intentionality or fully account for system-detectable error. This critique sets up the subsequent examination of teleosemantic theories as potential solutions to these fundamental challenges in theories of mental content.