Faced with the difficulties presented in Chap. 3 , this chapter takes Heidegger’s Kant-interpretation as a clue and proposes the horizonal interpretation of time. Heidegger, even in his “transcendental period” of 1920s, never fell prey to subjectivism; this means his work may be construed as a transcendental philosophy which does not presuppose subjective consciousness. The subjectivist interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of “time-horizon” is untenable. The horizonality of the horizon needs to be reconsidered: it presupposes neither a seeing subject nor a ground of absolute absence; rather, it means the “whereto” which orients and constitutes subjectivity. On the other hand, the subject, instead of actively constituting the horizon, “lets it be.” This reading of horizonality is affirmed by Section 24 of Heidegger’s Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1927–28). Analysis of the section shows that the structure of the now-horizon is local differentiation in originary unity; the structure of the horizon-of-having-been is releasement from a “here” to its “elsewhere”; the structure of the horizon-of-what-is-to-come is further determination of the yet-indeterminate identical being. Together, these three structures constitute a unified time-horizon; it is a transcendental horizon in the sense that it orients the subject with the alterity of the thing, thus making possible the temporal experience which seems to “belong to” the subject.