This chapter develops and defends a neo-Stoic approach to epistemic vice, modelled on the account of virtue from Chaps. 6 and 7 . After briefly canvasing some central Stoic claims about the nature of moral vice, we intersect these with the six principles we’ve analyzed as neo-Stoic virtue. Thus, we obtain six principles of neo-Stoic epistemic vice. (1VICE) The epistemic un-telos/anti-goal is identical to epistemic vice (=believing epistemically viciously). (2*VICE) Epistemic vice (=believing epistemically viciously) is the sole bearer of epistemically fundamental negative axiological status (i.e. vice is the sole epistemic bad). (3VICE) Negatively evaluated end states (e.g. false belief, ignorance, lack of understanding, unjustified belief) have non-fundamental epistemic dis-value (=they are epistemically dis-preferred indifferents). (4*VICE) Epistemic vice is a kind of stochastic cognitive dis-skill (where we understand dis-skill as the consistent deployment of poor performance rather than merely lacking skill). (5VICE) Epistemic vice is a reflection of epistemic un-conscientiousness (where un-conscientiousness is understood as (EpUnConsc)). (6*VICE) Epistemically vicious beliefs differ from epistemically unjustified beliefs by virtue of the way that they are formed, held, etc. Finally, I argue that the neo-Stoic vice epistemology constituted by (1VICE)–(6*VICE): (1) is distinct from motivationalism and obstructivism, (2) rejects ESE and EVE orthodoxy, and (3) addresses problems for both motivationalism and obstructivism.