Chapter 7 continues Chap. 6 ’s extension of Stoic moral theory to epistemology. We are left with three theoretical gaps. First, we need a substantive account of the content of epistemic virtue. Second, we need to explain how virtue can ground a unified cognitive character. And, finally, we need an epistemological parallel to the Stoic distinction between right and appropriate action. I contend that an approach to epistemic conscientiousness, when read in light of some key Stoic commitments, resolves these problems. I analyze epistemically conscientious belief as belief which would survive the conscious self-scrutiny of the rational agent. This model, I argue, bears important connections to the core Stoic doctrines of seeing one’s telos as following nature and defining virtue as a stable consistency of character. Thus, we obtain the final parts of the internalist virtue epistemology we seek: (5) Epistemic virtue is a reflection of epistemic conscientiousness and (6*) Epistemically virtuous beliefs differ from epistemically justified beliefs by virtue of the way that they are formed, held, etc. Combined with (1)–(4*) from Chap. 6 , these complete our neo-Stoic virtue epistemology.