At the end of the previous chapter, we found that a virtue-theoretic approach to epistemic value might be able to offer us a non-ESE approach to reject its hyper orthodoxy. So, what would (or could) rejecting ESE look like when directed along virtue-theoretic lines? This chapter explores this question in more detail. What we should notice first is that, once we shift our focus to epistemic virtue, a second epistemological orthodoxy regarding the nature of epistemic virtues comes into view; namely, epistemic externalism. After we examine this second orthodoxy in more depth, we’ll examine a cluster of interrelated objections to it. Finally, we’ll see how this second orthodoxy inherits the TTP and VERITY objections from Chap. 2 , adherents to the second externalist orthodoxy are versions of ESE. Thus, unless we can offer an unorthodox account of epistemic virtue, a virtue-theoretic approach to ESE orthodoxy cannot succeed. Since our second orthodoxy is externalism, the way forward must reject this. Thus, we’ll defend an internalist epistemology. We’ll point towards this at the end, but a generic internalism won’t suffice. A more nuanced internalism with respect to epistemic virtue will need to take more care with our epistemic aims and values as well as how they bear on virtue. First, though, we shall need to get clearer on our second orthodoxy about epistemic virtue.