In this chapter, we’ll survey and challenge the major extant approaches to fundamental epistemic value. Though important differences hold among the different versions of each theory type as well as the theories themselves, our first point in this chapter will be to show that these differences betray a more obscure agreement. Even though one particular view—affirming true belief as that which possesses fundamental epistemic value—is considered to be “orthodoxy” by some, it falls into a deeper agreement even with its “unorthodox” rivals. Hence, we can see this first order orthodoxy and its detractors as committed an underlying hyper orthodoxy (as I’ll call it) regarding the type of thing that bears fundamental epistemic value. Discussing these extant accounts of such value will help us see the hyper orthodoxy that unifies them all. As we’ll see, they all assume that some kind of end state produced by cognition must bear fundamental epistemic value. Thus, we can see all of these diverse approaches to epistemic value as a species of one general approach that I term End State Epistemology (ESE). With ESE thus conceived, we will examine two serious difficulties that its (extant) forms face—the Trivial Truths Problem and a variant of the New Evil Demon Problem that I call VERITY. While these objections give us, in my view, decisive reason to reject ESE hyper orthodoxy, they also point us towards a response that we’ll begin examining in Chap. 3 —i.e. virtue epistemology.