My interest lies in offering a phenomenological perspective on how noise is experienced, with particular attention to what may be common to different sorts of noise phenomena. I first argue for two desiderata that a phenomenological account of noise should satisfy: accommodating a plurality of noise experiences, on the one hand, and clarifying their specific phenomenal character, on the other. I then pursue these desiderata by examining some contemporary discussions of perception that have implications for how the phenomenal character of perceptual noise is to be understood; such discussions seem to rely on either an epistemic misfire view or a sensory misfire view of noise, respectively. After clarifying each view and its appeal, I convey concerns about the one and the other. I lastly propose a third alternative for understanding experiences of perceptual noise—a perceptual disjoint view—and point to how it ought to be explored. On the premise that there is something like a unity of perceptual experience in particular, I lay out the idea that there may then be many forms of ‘disunities’ of such experience. From an analysis of the latter, I suggest, one may account for many different types of experiences of noise, though with a common ‘phenomenal’ thread running through them.