This chapter discusses the nature and continuing relevance of the late-twentieth century anti-theory debate in anglophone, broadly analytic moral philosophy. It is argued that the strands of ethics that were labeled anti-theoretical were reactions not so much to theoretical work in ethics in general, but to a distinctive conception of theory as the production of action guiding hierarchical systems of moral principles. The philosophers labeled as anti-theorists were interested in the complexities of moral life—virtues, experience, emotions, historicity, context-dependency—that in this type of theory were routinely neglected. Over the past 30 years, however, a broadening of scope in moral philosophy has made ample room for various treatments of these topics in academic moral philosophy, alongside theoretical work of the late-twentieth century mainstream type. In the current scene of ethics there is less need for confrontations between theory and “anti-theory”, but a continuous need to reflect on the roles and nature of theorizing in ethics.