The boundary problem in psychiatry raises the difficulty of posing criteria to distinguish between what is pathological and what is not. This problem has also been one of the main sources of dispute between naturalistic and normativistic theories of mental disorders in philosophy of psychiatry. The main aim of this article is to address the boundary problem from the view known as regulative dispositionalism. According to this view, an attitude or mental faculty is a disposition, or set of cognitive, phenomenal, and behavioral dispositions, that is determined by normative criteria defined and sustained within a community of social agents. I argue that regulative dispositionalism can explain why the diagnosis of some mental illnesses seems to be influenced by social norms while biological facts may still underlie mental illnesses.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Regulative Dispositionalism: Toward a Metaphysics of Mental Disorder

  • Víctor Fernández Castro

摘要

The boundary problem in psychiatry raises the difficulty of posing criteria to distinguish between what is pathological and what is not. This problem has also been one of the main sources of dispute between naturalistic and normativistic theories of mental disorders in philosophy of psychiatry. The main aim of this article is to address the boundary problem from the view known as regulative dispositionalism. According to this view, an attitude or mental faculty is a disposition, or set of cognitive, phenomenal, and behavioral dispositions, that is determined by normative criteria defined and sustained within a community of social agents. I argue that regulative dispositionalism can explain why the diagnosis of some mental illnesses seems to be influenced by social norms while biological facts may still underlie mental illnesses.