This paper aims to shed some light on the metaphysical inquiry about the nature of intentional (and fictional) objects by putting forward a semantic analysis of the expressions we use to refer to them. I argue that such terms are formed by nominalizing expressions that belong to other logical categories than names and other parts of speech than those apt to refer. They then map the presentation of non-full-fledged-referential terms into objects. However, in playing this function, their use involves a distinctive kind of metalinguistic expressive role: that of being elaborated from and explicative of pragmatic features of the underlying nominalized expressions. As a result, they turn out to be merely ostensible singular terms, which refer to objects in the world only in the broad sense in which the world comprises linguistic norms and roles. Therefore, one does not need to countenance intentional (and fictional) objects to understand and grasp the use of the expressions that purport to refer to them.