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This chapter will introduce “the theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium” (Nash implementation) and present several theoretical results along with their proofs. The chapter will then apply these results to several examples involving voting rules. The final section of this chapter will show how a historical problem of choice, King Solomon’s Problem, which is known to be not Nash implementable, can be solved in several other ways using the results in the implementation theory.

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Implementation of Social Choice Rules

  • 章节

  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • Ismail Saglam

摘要

This chapter will introduce “the theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium” (Nash implementation) and present several theoretical results along with their proofs. The chapter will then apply these results to several examples involving voting rules. The final section of this chapter will show how a historical problem of choice, King Solomon’s Problem, which is known to be not Nash implementable, can be solved in several other ways using the results in the implementation theory.