This chapter evaluates key findings of the study and suggests some considerations for the strengthening of police-patrol oversight. Outsourcing US intelligence dramatically increased after 9/11 because of the expertise and personnel gap in the IC after 9/11. The more the complexity, the range of tasks and the need for new technologies increased, the more money had to be spent on outsourcing intelligence and the number of PICs rose, hence the IC began to rely heavily on private actors. However, PICs overcame existing monitoring mechanisms through one or a combination of the following reasons: their close relationship with the IC or US military, the politicisation of intelligence by the executive principal, inadequate congressional oversight, weak administrative oversight, ambiguous contractual processes, partly regulatory capture of the tasks and the IC’s dependency on PICs. Further, when police-patrol oversight failed, by information asymmetry (moral hazard and adverse selection), PICs could violate legislative rules and goals by performing inherently governmental tasks, colluding with the IC to support the executive principal's policies, capturing control of the task, capturing control of the contractual process, waste and fraud and abuse. So the main argument of this chapter is that the greater the changes in the ICs’ use of PICs, the greater the problems faced by those responsible for oversight.