This chapter reflects on the outsourcing of US covert drone operations in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia as well as the scope of PICs’ roles in these operations. After the 9/11 attacks, the AUMF approved by Congress and the MON signed by President Bush provided broad authorisation and discretion to the Executive to implement counter-terrorism measures through covert drone programmes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Technological improvements in unmanned aircraft led to the rise of covert drone operations because of their risk-neutral nature. However, as the demand for drone strikes increased, the agencies became increasingly dependent on contractors because of their expertise in the maintenance, loading, launching and landing of drones as well as piloting, and the analysis of intelligence data and video images. Although the CIA’s and JSOC’s covert drone programmes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia transformed into a kind of aerial warfare and resulted in civilian casualties, the police-patrol oversight by Congress failed to oversee adequately the CIA’s targeted killing programme and contractors’ involvement in drone strikes. The broad discretion of the Executive for fighting the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, the implicit support of the committees for targeted killings overseas, and finally congressional indifference were the main contributing factors for the failure of congressional monitoring. Because Congress failed to detect the problems in the CIA’s covert drone strikes and the delegation of contractors to some related tasks, third parties set off fire-alarms. Violation of rules led to moral hazard and adverse selection problems due to the delegation of contractors to perform inherently governmental tasks. Further, external fire-alarms revealed the international opposition to covert drone strikes and an increasing anti-American attitude. However, due to the support of the American public, domestic fire-alarms could only effectively ring for the extrajudicial killing of Americans overseas rather than the civilian casualties in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Despite the outcry from the third parties over the vast civilian casualties in covert drone operations, initial congressional responses in 2010 did not translate into any reforms since the American public did not oppose the drone attacks. Although several hearings were held in Congress on targeted killings by drone overseas, they were of an informative nature and did not instigate any legislative reforms. Extrajudicial killing of Americans by drone strikes overseas did, however, induce the Senate to push the Obama administration to disclose the legal bases of the targeted killings by using nomination power. The reaction of Congress showed that members were more concerned about the extrajudicial killing of Americans than about overseeing the executive’s counter-terrorism policy or addressing the mismanagement of drone strikes in terms of international law. Instead of overseeing the role of the CIA in the targeted killing programme, the SSCI waged a turf war against the other committees on Capitol Hill and the president in order to keep its influence over the drone programme. Ultimately the covert drone programme became politicised because the multiple principals struggled against each other for the implementation of their own policies. Consequently, the new Trump administration revoked the weak reporting system, and oversight of the covert drone programme returned to its original form. Overall, therefore, under the umbrella of governmental agencies, contractors could remain off the radar of the principals.

The Outsourcing of US Covert Drone Operations

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发表日期：

2025年

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Bülent Sungur

摘要

This chapter reflects on the outsourcing of US covert drone operations in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia as well as the scope of PICs’ roles in these operations. After the 9/11 attacks, the AUMF approved by Congress and the MON signed by President Bush provided broad authorisation and discretion to the Executive to implement counter-terrorism measures through covert drone programmes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Technological improvements in unmanned aircraft led to the rise of covert drone operations because of their risk-neutral nature. However, as the demand for drone strikes increased, the agencies became increasingly dependent on contractors because of their expertise in the maintenance, loading, launching and landing of drones as well as piloting, and the analysis of intelligence data and video images. Although the CIA’s and JSOC’s covert drone programmes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia transformed into a kind of aerial warfare and resulted in civilian casualties, the police-patrol oversight by Congress failed to oversee adequately the CIA’s targeted killing programme and contractors’ involvement in drone strikes. The broad discretion of the Executive for fighting the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, the implicit support of the committees for targeted killings overseas, and finally congressional indifference were the main contributing factors for the failure of congressional monitoring. Because Congress failed to detect the problems in the CIA’s covert drone strikes and the delegation of contractors to some related tasks, third parties set off fire-alarms. Violation of rules led to moral hazard and adverse selection problems due to the delegation of contractors to perform inherently governmental tasks. Further, external fire-alarms revealed the international opposition to covert drone strikes and an increasing anti-American attitude. However, due to the support of the American public, domestic fire-alarms could only effectively ring for the extrajudicial killing of Americans overseas rather than the civilian casualties in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Despite the outcry from the third parties over the vast civilian casualties in covert drone operations, initial congressional responses in 2010 did not translate into any reforms since the American public did not oppose the drone attacks. Although several hearings were held in Congress on targeted killings by drone overseas, they were of an informative nature and did not instigate any legislative reforms. Extrajudicial killing of Americans by drone strikes overseas did, however, induce the Senate to push the Obama administration to disclose the legal bases of the targeted killings by using nomination power. The reaction of Congress showed that members were more concerned about the extrajudicial killing of Americans than about overseeing the executive’s counter-terrorism policy or addressing the mismanagement of drone strikes in terms of international law. Instead of overseeing the role of the CIA in the targeted killing programme, the SSCI waged a turf war against the other committees on Capitol Hill and the president in order to keep its influence over the drone programme. Ultimately the covert drone programme became politicised because the multiple principals struggled against each other for the implementation of their own policies. Consequently, the new Trump administration revoked the weak reporting system, and oversight of the covert drone programme returned to its original form. Overall, therefore, under the umbrella of governmental agencies, contractors could remain off the radar of the principals.