This chapter presents an analysis of the mismanagement of contractors over the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issue. In 2002, President Bush had accused Iraq of developing WMD and for its close ties with the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. Subsequently, Congress demanded a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq from the IC because of the increasingly belligerent tone of the White House. Although the Hill did not or could not verify the estimates in the October 2002 NIE, Congress voted for the resolution which gave the president authority to initiate a war against Iraq. Notably, the legislators chose to trust and depend on the IC’s assessments of Iraq’s nuclear programme, so congressional police-patrol oversight failed to detect the false evidence which had also been analysed by the contractors in the October 2002 NIE. After the end of major operations in Iraq, concerns about the existence of WMD were raised in Congress, leading to the SSCI investigating the IC’s arguments in the NIE. It was disclosed that the CIA had relied on the supposed independence and expertise of PICs to sow doubts about the conclusions of other agencies (INR, DOE, UN, IEAS) regarding the purpose of the tubes. In other words, to please the executive principal, the CIA had used contractors to provide evidence based on the desired results; as an agent, however, the Agency had misled other principals—Congress and the American public—about the purpose of the aluminium tubes. Nonetheless, the partisanship atmosphere among voters, the self-criticism of the media, and negligence in regard to the evaluations of international organisations did not lead to a detailed examination of the role of contractors in the notorious NIE. Since Congress held the CIA responsible for the flaws in the October 2002 NIE, contractors were able to stay out of the oversight of the Hill. Although executive investigations highlighted the contractors’ role particularly in the tests of the aluminium tubes, they did not recommend any sanctions against or regulations for the contractors. The politicisation of intelligence in the October 2002 NIE and the failure of the IC before the 9/11 attacks led to the creation of a new head of intelligence, the DNI: Congress established a new agent in the IC who was responsible for the whole of the IC, and punished the former agent by abolishing the DCI post. Although the new DNI created a new layer of bureaucracy and raised concerns about efficiency, the primary role of the CIA in the IC effectively came to an end.

The Mismanagement of Contractors Over the Iraqi WMD Issue

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发表日期：

2025年

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Bülent Sungur

摘要

This chapter presents an analysis of the mismanagement of contractors over the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issue. In 2002, President Bush had accused Iraq of developing WMD and for its close ties with the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. Subsequently, Congress demanded a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq from the IC because of the increasingly belligerent tone of the White House. Although the Hill did not or could not verify the estimates in the October 2002 NIE, Congress voted for the resolution which gave the president authority to initiate a war against Iraq. Notably, the legislators chose to trust and depend on the IC’s assessments of Iraq’s nuclear programme, so congressional police-patrol oversight failed to detect the false evidence which had also been analysed by the contractors in the October 2002 NIE. After the end of major operations in Iraq, concerns about the existence of WMD were raised in Congress, leading to the SSCI investigating the IC’s arguments in the NIE. It was disclosed that the CIA had relied on the supposed independence and expertise of PICs to sow doubts about the conclusions of other agencies (INR, DOE, UN, IEAS) regarding the purpose of the tubes. In other words, to please the executive principal, the CIA had used contractors to provide evidence based on the desired results; as an agent, however, the Agency had misled other principals—Congress and the American public—about the purpose of the aluminium tubes. Nonetheless, the partisanship atmosphere among voters, the self-criticism of the media, and negligence in regard to the evaluations of international organisations did not lead to a detailed examination of the role of contractors in the notorious NIE. Since Congress held the CIA responsible for the flaws in the October 2002 NIE, contractors were able to stay out of the oversight of the Hill. Although executive investigations highlighted the contractors’ role particularly in the tests of the aluminium tubes, they did not recommend any sanctions against or regulations for the contractors. The politicisation of intelligence in the October 2002 NIE and the failure of the IC before the 9/11 attacks led to the creation of a new head of intelligence, the DNI: Congress established a new agent in the IC who was responsible for the whole of the IC, and punished the former agent by abolishing the DCI post. Although the new DNI created a new layer of bureaucracy and raised concerns about efficiency, the primary role of the CIA in the IC effectively came to an end.