This chapter explores corporate governance and adverse media signals as indicators of corporate fraud. It highlights board factors like size, independence, and financial expertise, emphasizing the risk of CEO duality. The chapter also discusses screening top management, focusing on executives' legal histories, bankruptcies, and age, suggesting that female CEOs may be unfairly perceived as less likely to commit fraud. It explores the relationship between CEO tenure and fraud risk, highlighting the significance of C-level churn rate. Additionally, the chapter covers adverse media screening (AMS), briefly touching on simple and advanced techniques to identify fraud signals in mainstream and social media. The chapter concludes by discussing the potential of integration of AMS into broader investigative tools.

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Screening for Corporate Governance Factors and Adverse Media Signals Related to Corporate Fraud

  • Jesper Sørensen

摘要

This chapter explores corporate governance and adverse media signals as indicators of corporate fraud. It highlights board factors like size, independence, and financial expertise, emphasizing the risk of CEO duality. The chapter also discusses screening top management, focusing on executives' legal histories, bankruptcies, and age, suggesting that female CEOs may be unfairly perceived as less likely to commit fraud. It explores the relationship between CEO tenure and fraud risk, highlighting the significance of C-level churn rate. Additionally, the chapter covers adverse media screening (AMS), briefly touching on simple and advanced techniques to identify fraud signals in mainstream and social media. The chapter concludes by discussing the potential of integration of AMS into broader investigative tools.