This chapter explores the moral status of artificial intelligence through the lens of Ted Chiang’s The Lifecycle of Software Objects. Using the concept of moral status, I examine whether Chiang’s digients—intelligent, evolving AI beings—should be afforded ethical consideration. Drawing from philosophical theories on personhood, sentience, and rights, I analyze the implications of granting AI moral status and whether they should be treated as animals, children, or legal persons. I argue that AI with cognitive and emotional capacities warrants protection and distinct rights, challenging conventional ethical boundaries between human, machine, and moral responsibility in an increasingly digital world.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Save the Digients! On the Moral Status of AI

  • Noelle Leslie Dela Cruz

摘要

This chapter explores the moral status of artificial intelligence through the lens of Ted Chiang’s The Lifecycle of Software Objects. Using the concept of moral status, I examine whether Chiang’s digients—intelligent, evolving AI beings—should be afforded ethical consideration. Drawing from philosophical theories on personhood, sentience, and rights, I analyze the implications of granting AI moral status and whether they should be treated as animals, children, or legal persons. I argue that AI with cognitive and emotional capacities warrants protection and distinct rights, challenging conventional ethical boundaries between human, machine, and moral responsibility in an increasingly digital world.