In this chapter we develop in detail the Nash-bargaining 2TSF model that is applicable to any bargaining situation, especially in bilateral wage negotiations which is the focus of the first empirical application of the chapter. We also present a no-Nash 2TSF bargaining model which is applied to international negotiations over military aid.

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Bargaining

  • Alecos Papadopoulos,
  • Christopher F. Parmeter

摘要

In this chapter we develop in detail the Nash-bargaining 2TSF model that is applicable to any bargaining situation, especially in bilateral wage negotiations which is the focus of the first empirical application of the chapter. We also present a no-Nash 2TSF bargaining model which is applied to international negotiations over military aid.