A Novel Protocol for Mitigating Wormhole Attack in Multi-hop Payment Channels
摘要
The rapid advancement of blockchain technology has highlighted critical issues, such as slow transaction speeds, which impede its widespread adoption. To address these limitations, layer-two protocols have been developed to process transactions off-chain, reserving the blockchain for dispute resolution. Among these, Payment Channel Networks offer a promising solution by enabling efficient multi-hoppayments through off-chain mechanisms. These networks utilize Hash Time-Locked Contracts to ensure secure conditional payments, releasing funds only when predefined conditions are met and ensuring that all transaction segments either succeed or fail together. However, traditional approaches to PCNs face significant security challenges, including Wormhole Attacks, Griefing Attacks, Bribery Attacks, and Balance Security issues. This study presents a novel cryptographic protocol designed to mitigate wormhole attack within multi-hopPCNs. By integrating HTLCs, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, and Schnorr signatures, the proposed solution enhances transaction security by locking funds and releasing them only after verifying the identities and actions of all involved parties. This research contributes a practical approach to improving the security of multi-hop payments, offering a robust defense against intermediary collusion and enhancing the overall reliability of blockchain-based financial transactions.