This chapter tests whether the regulatory capture hypothesis is confirmed in the case of the Paris-based European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). To do so it examines the process of drafting technical standards, the consultative practices and revolving doors in this relatively new EU agency. The chapter suggests a new interpretation of the relations between regulators and the regulated entities based on a joint deployment of Geoffrey Underhill’s notion of “embedded interests” (2000) and the analytical tools of EU-focused field sociology.

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Regulators and the Regulated in European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)

  • Yiorgos Vassalos

摘要

This chapter tests whether the regulatory capture hypothesis is confirmed in the case of the Paris-based European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). To do so it examines the process of drafting technical standards, the consultative practices and revolving doors in this relatively new EU agency. The chapter suggests a new interpretation of the relations between regulators and the regulated entities based on a joint deployment of Geoffrey Underhill’s notion of “embedded interests” (2000) and the analytical tools of EU-focused field sociology.