This chapter explores the role of lawyer-lobbyists within the European Union (EU), emphasising their influence on policy-making through a practice-centred approach. It contributes to the political sociology of EU lobbyists by focusing on the complex interplay between legal expertise and political influence within the EU. The EU regulatory state necessitates intermediaries, positioning lawyers as central actors who navigate and influence regulatory landscapes. Based on qualitative methodology, the study highlights how lawyer-lobbyists oscillate between legal and political work. Using the example of the ‘Google cases’, which relate to the application of European competition policies and have a complex judicial dimension, we show that even in such cases, lawyers do not confine their activities to legal analysis, but also coordinate and carry out communication and lobbying activities. Legal professional privilege often shields lawyer-lobbyists’ activities from regulatory scrutiny, blurring the lines between legal work and political / lobbying work. This loophole allows law firms to bypass the European Union Transparency Register (EUTR) requirements under the guise of legal duties, thereby challenging the efficacy of current lobbying regulations. The findings reveal a regulatory gap where lawyers exploit legal privilege to maintain opacity in lobbying, suggesting a need for reform to ensure transparency and accountability.

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The Political Sociology of the Lawyer-Lobbyist. Towards a Practice-Centred Approach to Political Influence

  • Lola Avril,
  • Emilia Korkea-aho

摘要

This chapter explores the role of lawyer-lobbyists within the European Union (EU), emphasising their influence on policy-making through a practice-centred approach. It contributes to the political sociology of EU lobbyists by focusing on the complex interplay between legal expertise and political influence within the EU. The EU regulatory state necessitates intermediaries, positioning lawyers as central actors who navigate and influence regulatory landscapes. Based on qualitative methodology, the study highlights how lawyer-lobbyists oscillate between legal and political work. Using the example of the ‘Google cases’, which relate to the application of European competition policies and have a complex judicial dimension, we show that even in such cases, lawyers do not confine their activities to legal analysis, but also coordinate and carry out communication and lobbying activities. Legal professional privilege often shields lawyer-lobbyists’ activities from regulatory scrutiny, blurring the lines between legal work and political / lobbying work. This loophole allows law firms to bypass the European Union Transparency Register (EUTR) requirements under the guise of legal duties, thereby challenging the efficacy of current lobbying regulations. The findings reveal a regulatory gap where lawyers exploit legal privilege to maintain opacity in lobbying, suggesting a need for reform to ensure transparency and accountability.