The tradition of an ideal-realist solution to the problem of reality, which bridges early Romanticism and the phenomenological movement, provides fertile ground for theoretical psychology. Several approaches, such as holistic and concrete psychology, draw on this tradition, but it has not yet been defended as a contribution to the theoretical foundations of the cognitive sciences. Occasionally, the meta-reflection returns to the problem of reality, for example in the debate on embodied cognition, but to engage with the prospect of Realpsychologie would diversify and deepen the discourse of theoretical psychology. In particular, ideal-realist reasoning may help to understand the problem of subject-matter and its foundation. From the continuous post-Kantian debate about reality, the subject-matter of expression emerges and requires critical examination. Phenomenological psychology possesses the discursive capacities to confront this issue and to integrate the philosophical debate about reality with the psychological debate about the subject-matter of the discipline.