This paper analyses regulatory competition in the digital economy through three interconnected lenses: theoretical foundations, EU framework conditions and practical applications in recent EU digital regulations. It demonstrates how the interplay between centralised and decentralised rule-making, including private ordering, shapes regulatory outcomes in digital markets. The paper finds that whilst the EU has opted for centralised regulation through the GDPR, DSA and AI Act internally, it maintains pockets of decentralised rule-making through private ordering mechanisms. Beyond the EU’s borders, the paper shows how these regulations affect global regulatory competition through two key mechanisms: the ‘effects doctrine’ and the ‘Brussels effect’. The analysis reveals that the EU has emerged as a central global rule-maker in digital regulation, capable of inducing a ‘race to the top’ through its European rights-driven regulatory model, whilst still preserving space for regulatory experimentation. This dual approach of centralised standard-setting with retained flexibility for innovation exemplifies how regulatory competition can be productively channelled in rapidly evolving digital markets.