Chapter 7 begins by discussing the most common criteria for justified critique, and shows why they are not sufficient for the critique that Critical Marxist Theory attempts. This is because they follow, rather blindly, the right-Hegelian doxa of immanentism for which all criteria that are not part and parcel of the existing order of things are ‘abstract’ or ‘externalist’ and thus philosophically naïve. After refuting this doxa, the chapter moves on to the justification and presentation of more positive and transcending forms of critique closer to theories of the good life which are important for today’s alternative Frankfurt School. Eventually, the chapter argues for political autonomy as the precondition of the good life and thus as a prenormative meta-criterion and as a rational criterion for critique.

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Which Criterion for Which Critical Theory? Towards the Meta-criterion of Political Autonomy as the Precondition of the Good Life

  • Lukas Meisner

摘要

Chapter 7 begins by discussing the most common criteria for justified critique, and shows why they are not sufficient for the critique that Critical Marxist Theory attempts. This is because they follow, rather blindly, the right-Hegelian doxa of immanentism for which all criteria that are not part and parcel of the existing order of things are ‘abstract’ or ‘externalist’ and thus philosophically naïve. After refuting this doxa, the chapter moves on to the justification and presentation of more positive and transcending forms of critique closer to theories of the good life which are important for today’s alternative Frankfurt School. Eventually, the chapter argues for political autonomy as the precondition of the good life and thus as a prenormative meta-criterion and as a rational criterion for critique.