The ZUC stream cipher is integral to modern mobile communication standards like 4G and 5G, playing a key role in securing data transmission across global networks. Although multiple attempts have been made to perform classical cryptanalysis of ZUC, it is surprising that no concrete efforts have been made towards its quantum cryptanalysis and related resource estimation. This paper presents a comprehensive quantum resource estimation of ZUC in the context of Grover-based quantum key-recovery attacks. We introduce novel circuit optimization techniques, such as modular quantum doubling and successive quantum modular addition, and implement reversible quantum logic circuit synthesis for both linear and non-linear functions to reduce the quantum resources required for implementing ZUC. We obtain that a full-scale Grover’s search on ZUC-128 requires approximately \(1.5 \cdot 2^{87}\) Clifford + T gates, with a T-depth of \(1.42 \cdot 2^{83}\) , and an overall circuit depth of \(1.42 \cdot 2^{84}\) , whereas for ZUC-256, these numbers are approximately \(1.67 \cdot 2^{151}\) , \(1.57 \cdot 2^{147}\) , and \(1.57 \cdot 2^{148}\) , respectively. Additionally, further evaluation of ZUC against NIST’s MAXDEPTH criterion confirms its security, albeit with a narrow margin, suggesting potential areas for future optimization and further analysis of ZUC’s resilience against quantum attacks.

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Quantum Cryptanalysis of ZUC and Related Resource Estimation

  • Suman Dutta,
  • Anirban Ghatak,
  • Anupam Chattopadhyay,
  • Subhamoy Maitra

摘要

The ZUC stream cipher is integral to modern mobile communication standards like 4G and 5G, playing a key role in securing data transmission across global networks. Although multiple attempts have been made to perform classical cryptanalysis of ZUC, it is surprising that no concrete efforts have been made towards its quantum cryptanalysis and related resource estimation. This paper presents a comprehensive quantum resource estimation of ZUC in the context of Grover-based quantum key-recovery attacks. We introduce novel circuit optimization techniques, such as modular quantum doubling and successive quantum modular addition, and implement reversible quantum logic circuit synthesis for both linear and non-linear functions to reduce the quantum resources required for implementing ZUC. We obtain that a full-scale Grover’s search on ZUC-128 requires approximately \(1.5 \cdot 2^{87}\) Clifford + T gates, with a T-depth of \(1.42 \cdot 2^{83}\) , and an overall circuit depth of \(1.42 \cdot 2^{84}\) , whereas for ZUC-256, these numbers are approximately \(1.67 \cdot 2^{151}\) , \(1.57 \cdot 2^{147}\) , and \(1.57 \cdot 2^{148}\) , respectively. Additionally, further evaluation of ZUC against NIST’s MAXDEPTH criterion confirms its security, albeit with a narrow margin, suggesting potential areas for future optimization and further analysis of ZUC’s resilience against quantum attacks.