Evaluating the Alternatives to Error Theory and Moral Abolitionism

Rather than agreeing that we should adopt moral abolitionism in light of compelling arguments suggesting that the folk notion of morality is untenable, one may argue that there are more philosophically plausible conceptions of morality available to us. In this chapter I consider some of these alternatives. One possible maneuver is to suggest that while a kind of morality based upon objective mind-independent properties is difficult to defend, a constructivist moral perspective based either on cultural or personal values could do the trick. Another move is to suggest that rather than eschewing the objectivist features of the folk notion of morality, we could preserve a forward-looking form of moral objectivism that eliminates elements of retributivism. Toward the end of this chapter, I consider whether there are alternatives to moral abolitionism open to those who reject the existence of moral truths, all of which involve pretending in some fashion that morality exists. I will argue that none of these alternatives to error theory or moral abolitionism succeed.