Arguments Against Moral Realism

This chapter addresses whether there are compelling theoretical and empirical reasons for rejecting the folk conception of morality. I will first consider what I take to be the most compelling theoretical arguments against the existence of objective moral truths, including the so-called “argument from queerness” first presented by J.L. Mackie (Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books, 1977). Next, I discuss non-empirical arguments that call into question the type of free will that people generally consider to be required for moral responsibility. From there I consider empirical reasons for rejecting morality, beginning with recent scientific research indicating that human beings lack free will. In the last section of the chapter, I discuss research indicating that our moral faculty owes its existence to evolutionary factors involving its propensity to encourage cooperation among our ancient ancestors. On the basis of morality’s origins, I argue that judgments coming by way of this faculty are unlikely to correspond to any facts.