Current affect theorists pose a challenge to the tradition of phenomenology for the “closed loop” in phenomenological approaches to perception and cognition that is thought to prevent the emergence of the unprecedented. This concept of “closed loop,” I will argue in this paper, cannot characterize Edith Stein’s phenomenological thesis of empathic acts based on a progressive, trial-and-error, yet open-ended model of perception and cognition that accommodates deception and its correction. In formulating the constitution of the psycho-physical individual, Stein maintains that neither outer perception nor inner perception is infallible and transparent in empathic acts. Proceeding from this hypothesis, she suggests a pedagogy of empathic acts that potentially contributes to a progressive knowledge of the semantic and syntactic meanings of affect. Taking this into account, this paper also seeks to identify the affinities and disputes between Stein’s phenomenology of empathic acts and today’s affect theories.