Truth, Relations, and Religion

In “Chapter 3: How to Properly Understand James’s Notion of Truth,” I contend that James's theory of truth is most effectively understood through the lens of radical empiricism. By framing radical empiricism as a form of process thought, the continuous relational nature of experience becomes clearer, addressing the challenges in James’s presentation of truth in Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. The common perception of James as a subjectivist regarding truth arises when we read Pragmatism in isolation, and I utilize Cheryl Misak’s critique as a counterpoint to offer a more nuanced interpretation of James’s process-oriented view of truth. Since radical empiricism blurs the line between subject and object, it compels a reevaluation of the subjectivist interpretation of James’s theory of truth. If James indeed merges the distinction between subject and object within a relational ontology, then his theory cannot be classified as subjectivist. Such a reading disconnects ideas and beliefs from the intricate relationality of experience. This chapter draws from a combined reading of Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth, with Jim Campbell’s distinction between recording cases and constitutive cases reinforcing a processual perspective on truth. A crucial aspect of this position is that faith and values manifest as constitutive cases only, integral to our agency and shaping our understanding of religious experiences.