Individuation as Ontogenesis: Reflections on the Husserlian Concept of Monad

This contribution aims to study the late husserlian conception of monad based on a phenomenological interpretation of the Leibnizian appetitus. The study of transcendental subjectivity as a monad provides an opportunity for Husserl to explore phenomenologicals problems such as the relation between time and instinct in the origin of organic life and therefore the individuation of the ego. This axe of research entail to consider the development of the ego in a genetic way, where passive shynthesis and instincts build the deepest dimension of the ego life, and where the ego itself finds his individuation in constant dialogue with the hyletic side of life. In particular, Husserl’s latest analyses try to think of the individuation of transcendental subjectivity as self-objectification of the monad into a personal ego, that is, as an associative temporalization based on instinctual intentionality. In this way phenomenology discovers new domains of investigation such as the connection and biogeneration of life in the notion of phylogenesis and the emergence of consciousness as ontogenesis. The monad makes possible to think about these questions within a philosophical-transcendental horizon, allowing a dialogue with the life sciences without, however, naturalizing intentional subjectivity.