Leibniz and the Problem of Metaphysics: Heidegger’s Interpretations in 1928 and 1955–1956

In his discussion and critique of metaphysics, Heidegger understood Leibniz first as an ally and then as an adversary. This article interprets two lecture courses from 1928 and 1955–1956 in which Heidegger takes first the one and then the other attitude. The article has three main parts: The first part looks at the 1928 lecture course and clarifies the connection Heidegger makes there between his program of a “metaphysics of Dasein” and his interpretation of Leibniz, at the heart of which is the idea of a temporal Drang grounding various forms of reasons and beings. The second part analyses Heidegger’s very different take on Leibniz in the 1955–1956 lecture course, where he characterizes Leibniz as the figure who introduced the principle of reason and thereby inaugurated modern metaphysics with its distinctive form of calculative rationality. The third argues that Heidegger’s self-critique from 1955 to 1956 does not entirely repudiate his 1928 position. Finally, the conclusion discusses some of the problematic political implications of Heidegger’s metaphysics of Dasein, implications that arguably constitute a challenge to temporal and historical thinking about metaphysics as such.