John Duns Scotus on God’s Concurrence with Natural Agents: A Defence Against the Charge of Causal Over-determination

This paper argues that John Duns Scotus defends a unique version of concurrentism that is not susceptible to the common objections that were occasionally raised in the scholastic period against other versions of concurrentism. In short, Scotus has systematic reasons for maintaining that natural (i.e., non-volitional and non-rational) efficient-causal agents cannot operate according to any per se teleological principle, but that their operation nonetheless depends upon some final causation. Thus, he can maintain that, in order to operate, a natural creature requires the cooperative action of God, who operates from per se final causality. This paper explores why Scotus views natural efficient causes as lacking per se final causality, but why he nonetheless maintains that their efficient causality depends upon some other source of final causality.