The first part of this book has shown the potential and the limits of Austin’s speech-act theory to approach poetic uses of language. We have seen in Chap. 3 that perlocution is the best candidate to understand the poetic effects of language, but it remains difficult to conceptualise without falling back into what Wittgenstein calls a ‘craving for generality’. Indeed, poetic effects of language seem hard to distinguish from the rather vague effects of language in general. How can we specify the effects—the performativity—of poetic utterances? To answer this question, we need to take a step back from the utterances themselves to the broader situation in which they are uttered. In other words, we need to move from Austin’s speech-acts to Wittgenstein’s language-games. In contrast to Austin’s speech-act qua utterance, a language-game consists in an activity that might combine various kinds of speech-acts. In this chapter, I argue that contemporary French readings of Wittgenstein bring to the fore the performative dimension of poetic language-games and help specify the effects of poetry.