What can poetry bring to the philosophy of language? Little, if we believe John L. Austin’s exclusion of poetry and other so-called parasitic utterances from his consideration in How to Do Things with Words. And he is not the only one to operate such an exclusion as most contemporary (analytic) philosophers of language seem to leave poetic utterances aside (or reduce them to metaphors or fictional utterances). Contra Austin, I believe that Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP), represented by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell in addition to Austin and others, has the potential to become a poetic philosophy of language. Poets and literary theorists have been quick to receive and adapt Austin’s speech-act theory to the study of literature and, through this adaptation, have contaminated his theory with the poetic and the literary. What can OLP bring to the study of poetry? And what does OLP look like through the lens of poetry? These questions will guide my reflections throughout this book.