Coleridge displays a distinct ambivalence about the role of analogy in his philosophy of nature, which has given rise to opposing scholarly accounts of his views on analogy. The goal of this chapter is to untangle the various uses, contexts, and meanings Coleridge gives to analogy in his philosophy of nature. This essay argues that Coleridge’s concerns regarding the notion of analogy reflect his general move to distinguish himself from what he and other contemporaries viewed as problems with Naturphilosophie, which he managed by limiting the role and scope of analogical reasoning in his account. In turn, Coleridge’s interest in analogy took a form particular to him. He aimed to retain the homogeneous root nature of powers, while maintaining qualitative distinctions in kind between aspects of different powers. This, the essay argues, is most clearly expressed in his dual representation of the plant–animal relation as simultaneously antithetical and hierarchical.