Reductions are the workhorses of cryptography. They allow constructions of complex cryptographic primitives from simple building blocks. A prominent example is the non-interactive reduction from securely computing a “complex” function f to securely computing a “simple” function g via randomized encodings. Prior work equated simplicity with functions of small degree. In this work, we consider a different notion of simplicity where we require g to only take inputs from a small number of parties. In other words, we want the arity of g to be as small as possible. In more detail, we consider the problem of reducing secure computation of arbitrary functions to secure computation of functions with arity two (two is the minimal arity required to compute non-trivial functions). Specifically, we want to compute a function f via a protocol that makes parallel calls to 2-ary functions. We want this protocol to be secure against malicious adversaries that could corrupt an arbitrary number of parties. We obtain the following results: