The Meaning of European Union from Within

It was unfortunate that Heath’s post-accession plans passed to other hands so soon after his political defeat in 1974. Two Labour leaders following him—Harold Wilson and James Callaghan—were both politically weak. The Tory party was divided, it lacked a strong parliamentary majority and the leadership was uncertain on the future role of Britain in Europe. In 1972, the economist Andrew Shonfield used the prestigious Reith Lectures to address the theme of UK membership (Andrew Shonfield, Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination, The Reith Lectures 1972. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00h3x7f ). They were broadcast under the headline: ‘A Journey to an Unknown Destination’. Less gloomily than the headline would suggest, Shonfield argued that a slow-paced adaptation of the UK to the EC environment was going to produce incremental change in both. He did not question the original institutional structure of the Community but made a strong case for its adaptation and reinvention. Wilson’s and Callaghan’s approach to EC membership followed a similar incrementalist path. They perceived political union and European Monetary Union (EMU) as evolutionary, with each step not agreed first in principle, but instead open to negotiation. This chapter reflects on the elements of affinity that link the future of the EC—as foreseen by Leo Tindemans in his report submitted in 1976 (The Tindemans Report, 1976. https://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/63f5fca7-54ec-4792-8723-1e626324f9e3) , and British post-accession expectations. It may surprise some readers that the Belgian prime minister and two Labour prime ministers in the 1970s could agree strategically on how to pursue integration in Europe via gradualism, pragmatism and the projection of Europe’s voice globally. But unanimity of views—quite apart from the UK position—on all areas of integration did not exist in the EC in the 1970s. Tindemans had struggled to reconstruct a consensual idea of union in his report at a time of division, severe economic recession, uncontrolled unemployment and uncertainty regarding the future. While so much remained undefined regarding the continuation of the UK’s political journey and its destination in the EC, this chapter underlines the effect on the other members of the EC of the slow British adaptation to the role of member state, progressing cautiously among inevitable controversies, when the two presidencies, of the Commission and of the Council of Ministers, came into British hands in 1977. Under Labour, the attitude of the UK can be defined as one which veered from that of a passive observer to moments of proactive and generally moderate confrontation, in issues such as demands for renegotiation and the 1975 referendum—and, later in the decade, the question of joining the European Monetary System (EMS). James Callaghan, Wilson’s successor, took the final decision not to join the new EMS in 1978 after a second round of tandem diplomacy with the German chancellor: almost a remake of the Heath–Brandt previous consultations in 1973, and equally convoluted. The 1975 referendum kept Britain in the EC but the positive economic shock effect which the pro-entry camp had promised failed to materialise within a global scenario of crises and challenges. Wilson’s renegotiation of the terms of entry in mid-1974 have fed the ‘awkward partner’ narrative (George in An awkward partner: Britain in the European community. Oxford, 1998) almost by default. Now that a rich literature on the 1970s and a comparison with the 2016 renegotiations are available, the first renegotiations can be described as a rite of passage, marked on both sides by the acceptance of British membership of the EC with all its baggage. The economy, with devolution for Scotland, rather than EC policies, brought down Callaghan in 1979; but the victory of Margaret Thatcher in that year was expected to return the most pro-European British party of the time in government.