Ìwà Metaphysics and Plant Sentience: A Case against Vegetarians

The place of the rights of non-human animals is no longer a contest in the mainstream and dominant academic circle. However, the extension of sentiencesentience or consciousness (with its implications) to non-human animals but not to plant invites critical scrutiny. Moral vegetarianism has been suggested as a template to justify a plant-based diet and condemn flesh-eaters as transgressors of the rights of non-human animals. Although the religious and spiritual significance of the blood of non-human animals have commanded attention among scholars, I limit myself to the argument for moral vegetarianismmoral vegetarianism in this chapter. I argue that: (1) carnivorous non-humans animals inflict pains and eat one another, in line with the ontological order; (2) humans, like other creatures, are omnivorous meaning they are ontologically inclined to consuming flesh and plants; (3) vegetarians are no different from flesh eaters since plants have been shown to possess sentience and consciousness; and (4) If propositions (1), (2) and (3) are valid, then I deduce that both flesh-eaters and vegetarians are morally culpable since this implies that humanities must desist from both consuming plant-based foods and non-human animals for their nourishment. For the arguments marshaled in this chapter, I rely on studies from plant neurobiologyplant neurobiology, the cellular basis of consciousness (CBC) and the metaphysical principles of panexperentialismpanexperentialism and vitalism to reinforce my position.