The Epistemic Implications of the Matter-Spirit Duality of Beings in Ìwà Metaphysics

The general character of scepticism attests and emphasises the folly in the quest toward dogmatic certainties as to finality of statements. In this connection, epistemologists have risen to the sceptical challenge of attempting to refute the proposals and the errors of cognition highlighted by the sceptics in the quest toward knowledge acquisition. In this chapter, I defend the central thesis of external world scepticism as I foray into the domains of the cognitive sciences, quantum and relativity theories, to disinter that nearly all of our cognitions of the actual world are not only unreliable in most cases but also disclose uncharitable misrepresentation concerning how the world works—an affair which is rendered intelligible from the purview of Ìwà metaphysics. From this purview, I submit that indeed scepticism continues to be a relevant domain of knowing whose main thesis ceaselessly calls for caution concerning human cognitive certainties as to the finality of statements regarding the actual world and its modus operandi. In a nutshell, this chapter evinces the fallibility thesis of Ìwà metaphysics.