Paul Feyerabend’s Search for Galileo’s Truth: Research Ethics for a Post-Truth Age
摘要
This chapter considers the research ethics appropriate to Paul Feyerabend’s notorious ‘methodological anarchist’ approach to the history and philosophy of science, concluding that it might be especially appropriate for our ‘post-truth’ times. The chapter begins by noting that Feyerabend favorite historical figure, Galileo, appears Janus-faced in his corpus. The chapter focuses on the positive image of someone who broke institutionalized rules of inquiry in pursuit of a ‘higher truth’ that was fully realized by Newton and his successors. The logic of Galileo’s early seventeenth century situation was that decisions about permissible forms of inquiry and inference were based on mixed political and epistemic criteria—and that this was known, and sometimes admitted, by all parties. Galileo played with this ambiguity to some but by no means complete success, largely because he could not properly ground his ‘higher truth’. The chapter proceeds to show that Galileo’s situation was not unique but commonplace in the history of science, a point that has become clearer since the rise of archival historical research in the nineteenth century. Moreover, the institutional incentives to commit, cover up and detect what we now call ‘research fraud’ have been very uneven. Most such fraud has probably passed undetected sufficiently long to be incorporated in the body of accepted scientific knowledge. In recent years, however, increased attention has been given to research fraud due to the increased existential and financial stakes involved, which in turn have contributed to science’s larger legitimacy crisis in the post-truth era. The chapter ends on a Feyerabendian note, suggesting that research findings should include sunset clauses and statues of limitations.