Richard Rorty and the Fate of Philosophical Judgement in Post-Truth America

Regardless of his ultimate standing as a philosopher, Richard Rorty exemplified the contemporary academic problem of finding a place from which to pass judgement. This chapter is devoted to contextualizing Rorty’s self-styled ‘Neo-Pragmatism’ as a distinctively American approach to ‘being orthogonal’, whereby he becomes an heir to Plato, Bacon and Kant, notwithstanding his own reflexive disclaimers. The chapter begins by unpacking the significance of Peter Strawson’s distinction between ‘descriptive’ and ‘revisionary’ metaphysics as a piece of mid-twentieth century boundary work in Anglophone philosophy, to which Rorty responded with a revised sense of ‘naturalism’ that played well in the science-friendly environment of US philosophy. This coincided with the broader post-Second World War transatlantic shift in the world’s center of gravity from Europe to the United States, which gave Rorty’s Neo-Pragmatism more widespread appeal than its original version. While enhancing Rorty’s reputation as a public intellectual, it increasingly caused problems within institutionalized philosophy, notwithstanding the years he spent in tow with the academic establishment. This discrepancy in perception has only increased with his death, such that nowadays Rorty is regarded (negatively) as the godfather of our post-truth condition. The chapter responds to this charge by recasting Rorty as an ‘orthogonal’ eavesdropper on what he dubbed the ‘conversation of mankind’, which offers valuable lessons for exercising judgement in today’s world.