EU and Russian Coercion: Manipulating the Cost-Benefit Calculations of the Moldovan and Armenian Governments

The third chapter assesses the exploitation of existing economic and security dependencies (i.e., coercion) by the EU and Russia. It presents a systematic comparison of their uses of coercive actions towards Moldova and Armenia and an analysis of the perceptions of local actors. Both the EU and Russia coerced Moldova and Armenia, but the difference was in the institutionalisation of the mechanism. The chapter details the coercion mechanism, illustrating how threats influence the political elite’s preferences. The effectiveness of coercion depends on the communicated threats, rewards, and demands, and how these are perceived by the target state’s political elite. It also considers the existing interdependencies with other powers and the local context in which coercive activities are received. EU conditionality was perceived as positive and legitimate, associated with economic opportunities and reforms beneficial to the countries. Russian coercive actions were seen as negative and threatening, creating fear and resistance. This difference in perception highlights the importance of normative justification in the effectiveness of coercive strategies. This comparative analysis provides valuable insights into the dynamics of hegemonic power in the shared neighbourhood of the EU and Russia.