Human Dignity in Feminist Vocabulary

This chapter traces the most typical uses of the concept of human dignity in feminist discourses. The main idea through which dignity entered these discourses is objectification. This concept is based upon the Kantian principle that people should never be treated only as a means, here being applied to specific social practices or behaviors that downgrade women to the level of things, particularly those related to sex (including rape, prostitution and pornography). In the case of certain authors, human dignity is used as an argument for the legal abolition of sexual harassment and exploitation, which are regarded as typical phenomena of objectification. In the second type of feminist discourses, human dignity is critically approached as an element of (in Peter Sloterdijkʼs terms) the thymotic conceptual arsenal that closely ties it with independence, autonomy, impartiality, justice, etc. When connected to this set of ideals, human dignity is considered as disruptive for the recognition and appreciation of some important moral phenomena and values, such as care, empathy, interdependence, and trust, and even as being supportive to men’s dominance over women. The third type of dignity use focuses on shame societies and the relation between shame and dignity, and juxtaposes ancient dignitas, shaming practices, patriarchal rank, and honor with those societies respectful of the human dignity of women. Patriarchal shame practices, honor societies, and public shaming practices in general, not only disadvantage women, but also directly or indirectly contribute to destroying their dignity and lives. Three identified uses of human dignity in feminist discourses differently address contemporary morality, law, or practical philosophy. This chapter explains in what way they call for a more consistent protection of human dignity, a more nuanced approach to the idea of dignity, or challenge certain fundaments of contemporary law and morality.