Specific Rights in Nonhuman Animal Rights Declarations (Part 2)

The division into persons and non-persons is by no means insignificant from a legal and ethical point of view. A human person enjoys a certain legal protection which other sentient beings are denied. The dignity (= inherent value) of a human person is recognised. This tends to be denied to nonhuman animals who are in general not recognised as persons. Meanwhile, the concept of “person” is also viewed critically in the animal ethics discussion, as it is rooted in a speciesist-perfectionist outlook. Maneesha Deckha (2021) points out that the category of legal personhood is anthropocentric, and thus not helpful when it comes to the project of creating just multispecies societies. The personhood concept is a tool of discrimination, as it is also used within a species (although intuitively definitely justified in part) to divide human beings into groups that have different rights and obligations. From a legal point of view, the personhood concept is also flexible and stretchable, as it is not limited to human beings. Think, for example, of nonhuman entities called “legal persons” (e.g. associations, corporations, foundations, etc.).