Jonathan Haidt: Social Intuitionism and Moral Foundations Theory

This chapter engages with contemporary moral psychology via the work of Jonathan Haidt, with the intention being to strike a dialogue and exchange between contemporary sociological and psychological accounts of morality. It uses Haidt’s work to explore key arguments in moral psychology regarding moral judgement, as well as Haidt’s specific arguments about innateness and moral foundations. It is argued that Haidt—and contemporary moral psychology more generally—provides crucial insights into moral judgements and into diversity in how the moral domain is understood. Haidt’s key positions of social intuitionism and moral foundation theory are expounded in sections one and two. Section three argues that there are limitations to the extent to which moral action can be understood as being intuitively driven, especially with respect to complex (but relatively ordinary) moral decisions in everyday life contexts. It is then argued that important dimensions of social relationships and power need to be given greater credence in Haidt’s account. This relative absence causes limitations for explaining moral change in the moral foundations framework. The conclusion explores potential issues that emerge from moral accounts that claim to be purely descriptive and normatively neutral.