Empathy in the Context of the Hermeneutics of Suspicion
摘要
The purpose of this chapter is to bring the practice of a rigorous and critical empathy to the hermeneutics of suspicion. Toril Moi’s account of the hermeneutics of suspicion applies to a clumsy, stereotyped version of the hermeneutics of suspicion, not to Ricœur’s approach. Moi’s version is not suspicion; it is dogmatism. What is “hidden in plain view” is exemplified in Wittgenstein (“surface grammar” from “depth grammar” distinguished) and Tolstoy. Moi quotes Simone de Beauvoir, attributing to reading literature the possibility of giving one a “taste of another life.” This is the empathic moment. Ricœur is not regarded as a philosopher of empathy such as Max Scheler or Edith Stein (though Ricœur’s practice of it as a teacher was at a high empathic level), and the title of this chapter is intended as a provocation to “consider the possibility.” For Ricœur, empathy would not be a mere psychological mechanism. Empathy would be the ontological presence of the self with the Other as a way of being—listening as a human action that is a fundamental way of being in which “hermeneutics can stand on the authority of the resources of past ontologies.” In a rational reconstruction of what a Ricœurian approach to empathy would entail, a logical space is made for empathy to avoid the epistemological paradoxes of Husserl and the ethical enthusiasms of Lévinas. How this reconstruction of empathy would apply to empathic understanding, empathic responsiveness, empathic interpretation, and empathic receptivity is elaborated from a Ricœurian perspective.