Applications for Civil Conflict Studies

This chapter further extends the theoretical framework established in the prior chapters of this book to develop a set of hypotheses relating to the political economy of civil conflict. Specifically, this chapter predicts that in nondemocratic states, the number of competing economic elites is positively associated with the probability of civil conflict, a result of greater competition over public policy in a weak institutional context spilling over into violence. In democratic states, the number of competing economic elites is negatively associated with the probability of civil conflict, a result of greater competition over public policy providing an incentive to rein in the risk of conflict with stronger institutional commitments. These predictions are substantiated empirically using data from V-Dem and Polity V. This chapter also explores an important conditioning variable, which is the presence of military elites. Because military elites largely control the use of force, their relative number is also important. States with few economic elites and also fewer military elites are more at risk for conflict outcomes because elites have a stronger incentive to ally and pursue private goods through extralegal means.