The chapter analyzes Hans Reichenbach’s critical engagement with Dewey’s philosophy in his “Dewey’s Theory of Science” from 1939. The opening pages give a brief description of Reichenbach’s oeuvre and his position within the history of analytic philosophy. The first half of the chapter then goes on to describe the views that Reichenbach attributes to Dewey as well as his assessment of these views. More specifically, it not only describes how Reichenbach took Dewey to think that the objects of ordinary life are more real than scientific objects and that ethics is amenable to objective inquiry but also explains how Reichenbach thinks that Dewey’s philosophy, despite Dewey’s protestations, is at bottom driven by a desire for transcendence. The second half of the chapter assesses Reichenbach’s engagement with Dewey’s philosophy and argues not only that Reichenbach is wrong to attribute to Dewey the view that the things of ordinary experience are more real than scientific objects but also that he is mistaken when he relates Dewey’s thinking about ethics and inquiry to a desire for transcendence. The question of immanence and transcendence is, however, central. From a Deweyan perspective, Reichenbach’s own way of thinking about science and common sense thus seems to express a desire for transcendence, and the chapter ends by suggesting the question of transcendence and immanence might serve as a starting point for a more fruitful dialogue than the one expressed through Reichenbach’s externalist engagement with Dewey’s philosophy in “Dewey’s Theory of Science.”

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Immanence, Transcendence, and the Varied Fullness of Life: Hans Reichenbach Reads Dewey

  • Martin Ejsing Christensen

摘要

The chapter analyzes Hans Reichenbach’s critical engagement with Dewey’s philosophy in his “Dewey’s Theory of Science” from 1939. The opening pages give a brief description of Reichenbach’s oeuvre and his position within the history of analytic philosophy. The first half of the chapter then goes on to describe the views that Reichenbach attributes to Dewey as well as his assessment of these views. More specifically, it not only describes how Reichenbach took Dewey to think that the objects of ordinary life are more real than scientific objects and that ethics is amenable to objective inquiry but also explains how Reichenbach thinks that Dewey’s philosophy, despite Dewey’s protestations, is at bottom driven by a desire for transcendence. The second half of the chapter assesses Reichenbach’s engagement with Dewey’s philosophy and argues not only that Reichenbach is wrong to attribute to Dewey the view that the things of ordinary experience are more real than scientific objects but also that he is mistaken when he relates Dewey’s thinking about ethics and inquiry to a desire for transcendence. The question of immanence and transcendence is, however, central. From a Deweyan perspective, Reichenbach’s own way of thinking about science and common sense thus seems to express a desire for transcendence, and the chapter ends by suggesting the question of transcendence and immanence might serve as a starting point for a more fruitful dialogue than the one expressed through Reichenbach’s externalist engagement with Dewey’s philosophy in “Dewey’s Theory of Science.”