The Common Consent of Words: An Aristotelian Element of Hobbesian Legal Rhetoric
摘要
An abbreviated English translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric—A Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique (1637)—has often been ascribed to Thomas Hobbes. This association has made those studying the English reformer uneasy, for as Ioannis Evrigenis observes in Images of Anarchy, they “have found it difficult to fit it into the neat story of Hobbes’ turn to science.” This chapter shows how the Briefe may not be so out of place in this so-called scientific phase by illustrating how some of Hobbes’ later works like his Elements of Law and De Cive—often understood as rejections of humanist learning—still rely on Aristotelian rhetoric in his considerations of the source of civil laws. In his new civil science, Hobbes sketches how one can communicate knowledge of the law by expanding the reach of “common opinion,” a notion tied to the Aristotelian rhetorical concept of homologoumena or “agreements.”