inancial independence for central banks is often taken to mean that their profits should be high enough to cover their operating costs, and that there should be financial buffers to cover unexpected losses so that the central bank does not have to be recapitalized too often. In this paper, we present a case study on these questions by describing the experiences of Sveriges Riksbank. Since the Riksbank became more independent in 1999, there have been three formal reviews initiated by the Swedish parliament. In 2023 a new Riksbank Act came into effect, incidentally right after the Riksbank’s equity was completely eroded. On 2 April 2024, the Riksbank, in line with the new law, asked the parliament for a recapitalization. In this paper, we describe the factors that have been viewed as important for the judgements about how much capital the Riksbank needs, and present a method for estimating the probability of recapitalization. Volatility in financial prices, in combination with the current legislated framework and likely scenarios for the Riksbank’s future balance sheet, lead to relatively high estimated probabilities for future recapitalizations.